





Police responses to crime have traditionally been offender-focused and, thus, disconnected with the *spatial* analysis that informed the response. One benefit of **risk terrain modeling** that is especially apropos for a new era of policing is an **emphasis on intervention activities that focus on places**, not just people located at certain places – which jeopardize public perceptions and community relations.

One lesson from this is that crime statistics, alone, should not dictate police action. Simmering frustrations and frayed relations between police and the public they serve can be exacerbated when crime analyses and intelligence products fail to elucidate root attractors of illegal behavior. And especially when responses to spatial intelligence fail to acutely address the qualities of places and fail to look beyond merely the people located there. We have witnessed many disconnects among crime intelligence products, policies and policing practices. One of which can be when a statistical assessment process focuses on crime counts and locations, and then when the response plan focuses almost exclusively on people at certain places (i.e., and ignores the spatial attractors of illegal behavior located there). Secondly, disconnect often happens when measures of police productivity are reliant on the persistence of the illegal activities that are sought to be prevented (i.e., such as when productivity measures depend on people to be stopped, ticketed or arrested), rather than on more sustainable and benign measures, such as efforts/actions associated with reducing spatial influences of risky features. If the cliché dark alleyway has a lot of crime, start to solve the problem by fixing the lights.

Risk reduction strategies have dual objectives: One to **reduce crime counts** and the other to **reduce** the **spatial influences** of known risk factors.

